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Introduction
The automotive industry in the Republic
of Turkey is almost as old as the country itself,
dating back to the 1920s. Trade Minister Nihat
Ergünhas has said that the automotive industry
is “the locomotive of our economy.” (“Premier
Erdog˘an’s . . .”) Over the last 20 years, thanks to
favorable trade agreements and many unique
Turkish competitive advantages, large invest-
ments have made Turkey home to numerous
automotive products destined for European and
other markets. Within Turkey the entire auto-
motive sector accounts for a substantial portion
of industrial production and employs over one
half million people. Manufacturing more than
half of its vehicles for export, Turkey is one of
the largest producers of commercial vehicles
and buses for Europe. In short, Turkey’s auto
industry has developed into a cornerstone of the
modern Turkish economy, and it will play a vital
part in Turkey’s economic future.
In this article I present an overview of
the Turkish automotive industry as a whole,
encompassing both commercial and private
vehicles. Within the overall automotive sector,
there is also a large automotive parts industry
supporting the many manufacturers and assem-
blers as well as the Turkish defense industry.
Although I focus mainly on the major produc-
ers who build complete vehicles, it is important
to note that the parts industry contributes
significantly to overall production, exports, and
employment. First, I look at the factors that
have led to this industry becoming so promi-
nent in Turkey. After describing the history of
the industry’s development, I discuss its recent
growth and analyze how the industry will
impact the country’s future. What makes Turkey
a unique place in the EU to produce cars? How
does Turkey compare to other auto-producing
nations? How has the recent economic crisis
affected the industry’s future? The complete
story of this industry’s rise to prominence and
future importance within Turkey is a fascinat-
ing blend of history and political economy.
13
TURKEY’S AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY:
DRIVEN TO GROW
CJ Berzin
Industry History
In 1929 Turks first ventured into the auto-
motive industry when the founder of Turkish
mega-conglomerate Koç Holdings, Vehbi Koç,
became a Ford retailer. Under his import and
retail agreement with Ford, Koç assembled cars
from kits of prepackaged parts. This remained
the only automotive activity in Turkey until
1964, when Koç created the Anadol brand.
(Bursa, p. 4) The Anadols were innovative in
design for their time, yet borrowed heavily from
Ford’s and other foreign auto companies’ tech-
nologies. Over 100,000 Anadols were built by
Koç’s Otosan company, which was also under
agreement to assemble Fords in Turkey. The
success of Otosan opened the door for other
auto companies to enter the country. Through
the late 1960s until the 1980s, numerous for-
eign companies opened their own plants in
Turkey, including Renault, Fiat, and Ford. Ford
eventually purchased part of Koç’s Otosan com-
pany; and this partnership still exists today. (Koç
also maintains a joint venture with Fiat.) Of the
more than 1,300 automotive companies in
Turkey (“Turkey’s Automotive Parts . . . ,” p. 18),
many are foreign owned, thanks to various gov-
ernmental policy changes throughout the late
1980s and into the 1990s.
Starting in the 1980s Turkey initiated an
economic liberalization policy that privatized
many industries and allowed Turkish businesses
to be open to foreign investors and trade. The
government’s previous policy was one of import
substitution, a policy that did not allow for the
competitive development of the auto industry.
(Wasti and Wasti, p. 120) Despite Turkey’s ongo-
ing liberalization in the 1980s, production in
Turkey was still mainly geared for internal con-
sumption due to high export tariffs and trade bar-
riers with Europe. This changed with the Cus-
toms Union agreement between the EU and
Turkey in December 1995. This agreement can
be viewed as the turning point for Turkish indus-
try and provided the jumpstart for auto indus-
try growth, as it allowed the automotive export
market to flourish. The changes that this agree-
ment effected greatly altered how the auto indus-
try was able to operate and compete; Turkey could
now be a regional and worldwide participant. The
Customs Union, and its crucial role in the indus-
try’s history, will be discussed inmore detail later.
In 2001 the Turkish economy took a dras-
tic turn for the worst as the financial system suf-
fered a collapse. The meltdown of the Turkish
financial system reinforced the importance of
exports and external markets to Turkish auto
companies. During a conversation I had while
in Turkey with Nuri Özsüer, Chairman and
past CEO of the Maya Group (a Turkish real
estate developer), he noted the event’s impor-
tance, saying that it forced Turkish companies
to look for more stable markets outside their
borders and to place a greater emphasis on
exports. (Özsüer) The changes caused by the col-
lapse helped to establish Turkey as an auto
exporter to the EU, a valuable arrangement,
yet one that must be vigilantly cultivated.
The effects of the changes that Turkey’s
economy and auto industry experienced
between the late 1990s and the early 2000s
are easily seen. Turkey’s GDP (in current U.S.$)
increased from $169.71 billion in 1995 to
$794.23 billion in 2008. (World Bank . . .)
Though there were a few years of negative
growth due to financial and economic tur-
moil, this is impressive growth overall. The
increase in foreign direct investment (FDI)
spurred by opening the economy enabled the
auto industry to reach its current position of
prominence. Foreign direct investment helped
to fund increases in capacity and product qual-
ity as well as research and development for
newmodels being made in Turkey. By some esti-
mates, 40 percent or more of the Turkish auto
industry has been financed by outside sources
even as far back as 1999. (“Turkey’s Automo-
tive Parts . . . ,” p. 19) Auto production increased
from about 320,000 units in 1995 to over 1.1
million units in 2008. (Tezer) An important sta-
tistic, capacity utilization, which illustrates to
what degree the factory’s throughput is being
maximized, greatly improved for Turkish auto
manufacturers as exports grew. Capacity utiliza-
tion increased from 29 percent in 2002 to nearly
90 percent in 2007. (Bursa, p. 6) The emergence
of Turkey as a production center for Europe pro-
vided the necessary demand to grow the indus-
try through an export-oriented strategy. At
the same time, the industry became inseparable
from Turkey’s economic success and long-
term development.
This success is evident today, as the Turk-
ish automotive industry accounts for the largest
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portion of Turkey’s exports, eclipsing even tex-
tiles and other iron and steel products. (Under-
secretariat . . .) In 2008 auto exports were val-
ued at over $22 billion. (Ergün) Nearly 80
percent of the production of the Turkish auto-
motive industry ends up overseas. The indus-
try and its affiliates employ over 500,000 peo-
ple. (“Is Turkey Worth It?”) The auto industry
now has the capacity to build over 1.5 million
vehicles a year (“General and Statistical Infor-
mation . . .”), an impressive quantity consider-
ing the industry’s youth. The presence of an
auto industry in a developing country also often
causes other interdependent industries to
develop as well. (Bekmez and Komut, p. 184)
Manufacturing systems expert Dr. Mustafa Yur-
dakul of Gazi University in Turkey goes fur-
ther to say that the automotive industry has
close relationships with many other sectors and
that the large volume of business between the
auto industry and its partners has a substan-
tial effect on the country’s economy. (Yur-
dakul and Tansel, p. 2) What caused the devel-
opment of the Turkish auto industry and how
does it compare to those of other countries? The
answer leads to an understanding of Turkey’s
rapid growth and how recent economic events
will shape the future of both the auto industry
and the country.
Why Turkey? Domestic Factors
Leading to Growth
Knowledge of Turkey’s domestic market is
necessary in order to appreciate what compet-
itive factors caused Turkey to become an auto-
motive manufacturing center. Even before inter-
national trade had such a large impact on the
industry, factors existed that made Turkey
attractive to automotive producers. These fac-
tors not only helped prepare Turkey to benefit
from trade deregulation, but also helped to
shape Turkey’s manufacturing strengths.
As many Turks are proud to share, their
country has an educated, skilled, and rela-
tively inexpensive workforce. Furthermore,
Turkey’s large population is rather young com-
pared to those of other EU countries, giving it a
good base from which to increase employ-
ment. The assembly of durable goods and even
automobiles dates back decades; and the educa-
tion system in Turkey produces a work force
with many valuable technical skills and
advanced degrees.
Turkey is also fortunate to be in a highly
strategic location — well positioned to serve
markets in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and
Africa. It is also at the crossroads of many devel-
oped and developing countries. Its unique loca-
tion makes it an ideal place for industries to host
operations which can easily serve a variety of
markets. Most automotive companies are
located close to the gateway city of Istanbul,
along the busy shipping lanes of the Bosporus.
The proximity to a vast international trans-
port network and an abundance of workers
makes this region an ideal one for export-
based auto production.
Turkey’s automotive parts sector, which
has grown concurrently with the auto produc-
ing sector, was greatly improved by Turkey’s
long-established aftermarket parts sector. These
companies, which don’t produce whole cars and
sell directly to consumers, make their own
brands of replacement and add-on parts for vehi-
cles. In 2008 automotive parts production of all
kinds surpassed $7 billion in exports alone.
(Sonmez and Sari, p. 10) Turkey has also had to
sustain a large parts business for its own con-
sumption. (“Turkey’s Automotive Parts . . . ,”
p. 21) The poor quality of roads in Turkey and
the lack of an extensive modern road system
make for harsh operating conditions. The after-
market and replacement parts business thrived
for years in Turkey, enabling Turks to modify,
repair, and maintain their vehicles that were
constantly abused by the poor roads.
The road problems are compounded by
how dispersed the Turkish population is. The
rail system is undeveloped, and therefore goods
must travel mostly by truck or other commer-
cial vehicle. (Barnett, p. 60) The market demand
and subsequent specialization that this creates
are reasons for Turkey’s becoming a major
exporter of commercial vehicles to the rest of
the world. Turkey’s underdeveloped rail trans-
portation system and low rate of personal auto-
mobile ownership also affect personal travel.
Turkey is the largest bus producer in the EU due
to this internal demand for other forms of trans-
portation. (“Turkey’s Automotive Industry,”
p. 1)
As Turkey continues to develop and its
GDP rises, more Turks will be in the market
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for personal automobiles. In many areas, per-
sonal cars are the only transportation choice
other than buses. This is particularly evident
in Turkey’s largest city of Istanbul. During my
trip to Istanbul the huge volume of vehicle traf-
fic was frustratingly noticeable; and the num-
ber of bikes and scooters was surprisingly low.
Because of the large area of the city and its hilly
topography, motorcycles and bikes are uncom-
mon; and cars are seen as the best alternative.
Turkey’s rapid development at the end of
the twentieth century and its favorable demo-
graphics make the domestic market attractive
to major auto companies and provide motiva-
tion for these companies to produce in Turkey.
With a large portion of its population under
40 years old, Turkey provides a source of future
consumers and a foundation upon which to base
future domestic growth. It was estimated in
2005 that there were only 92 cars for every 1000
people. (“Is Turkey Worth It?” p. 2) Despite
the growth in the industry during those years,
domestic automobile ownership remains low;
clearly there is room to grow.
Messe Frankfurt, the German trade show
producer, issues reports about local markets
that are published in tandem with its shows. Its
automotive market report for the Auto-
mechankia Istanbul show states that “foreign
investors can anticipate significant potential
in the Turkish automotive industry” and that
“these receptive market conditions, combined
with a growing population and increasing pur-
chasing power, stimulate extremely favorable
opportunities on all levels of operation and pro-
duction.” (“Turkish Automotive Market . . .”)
While there are many domestic factors that have
helped the Turkish automotive industry to
thrive, the essential factors in the industry’s
impressive growth have been international ones.
These same factors will continue to drive the
industry forward in the future, as I discuss in
the following sections.
External Influences
The Past: Customs Union with
the EU
As mentioned earlier, the 1995 Customs
Union Agreement had a large impact on Turkey
and its industries. The agreement was part of
the Ankara Treaty, which was seen as a first step
towards future EU accession. It was intended to
foster convergence of Turkish policies towards
already established EU ones. Entrance to the
Customs Union required the elimination of
some taxes, tariffs, and quotas and was intended
to pave the way for full EU membership. (Bek-
mez and Komut, p. 186) Turkey’s bid to join the
EU has also significantly bolstered the country’s
financial and legal standards. Although the Cus-
toms Union agreement was signed in December
1995 and took effect in January 1996, the full
benefits were not realized until 1999. It took a
number of years for the necessary legal frame-
work and tax law modifications to become com-
pleted. (Bekmez and Komut, p. 186)
The fully implemented Customs Union has
had a trade creation effect on Turkey, as well
as a positive trade diversion effect. Trade cre-
ation results when a country’s trade increases
upon entering a customs agreement because the
country then becomes a low-cost competitor.
Trade diversion results when a country trades
more with its union partners due to its union
commitment, even when it might not be the
most economically advantageous trade option.
Both effects have been observed in the Turk-
ish economy in the years after the implemen-
tation of the agreement with the EU. (Bekmez
and Komut, p. 186) The effect of the agree-
ment on the automotive industry can be easily
seen by the ratio of Turkey’s EU automotive
exports and imports, as shown in Bekmez and
Komut’s research on the competitiveness of the
Turkish auto industry compared to that of the
EU. Between 1996 and 1998 (and presumably
before this time period as well) the vehicle
export-to-import ratio between Turkey and
the EU ranged from .15 to .20; Turkey imported
much but exported little. By 1999 the export-to-
import ratio had increased to .33. In the five
years immediately after, the ratio ranged
between .7 and 1.1. In vehicle terms, Turkey
exported over 900,000 vehicles in 2008. (“Turk-
ish Automotive Industry,” p. 1) The Customs
Union greatly benefitted the industry, and it also
forced Turkey into a new competitive arena, pit-
ting it against established European manufac-
turing powerhouses and up-and-coming low
cost producers. Figure 1 breaks down Turkey’s
total yearly production into domestic and
exported components and shows the percentage
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of vehicles that were exported. The year 1999
marks the beginning of the increase in exports
that the Customs Union agreement allowed.
Because of this agreement, Turkey has
flourished not only as a producer of vehicles but
also of white goods (e.g., textiles and linens) for
Europe. Due to its decades of experience, estab-
lished producers, and low costs, Turkey has
proven to be a great production alternative to
the post-communist countries of central
Europe. Also, Turkey is seen by some manu-
facturers trying to break into the EU market-
place, such as the Chinese auto manufacturer
Cherry, as a steppingstone and entrance point.
(Bursa, pp. 3, 18) In 2005 the Turkish Auto-
motive Manufacturers Association General Sec-
retary, Ercan Tezer, summarized the effects of
the Customs Union agreement by saying that
“focus shifted to international markets, and
Turkey became an extraordinarily attractive
option for whoever wanted to produce for the
European Markets.” (“Is Turkey Worth It?” p. 2)
The Present: The World Auto Crisis
In the last few years the biggest chal-
lenge for the Turkish automotive industry has
been the economic crisis and its effect on world
auto sales, not competition from foreign com-
petitors. The drastic economic downturn has
hurt individuals and businesses alike, damaging
all elements of auto industry sales and pro-
duction. In contrast to the 2001 Turkish finan-
cial crisis, which occurred only in Turkey and
which caused Turkish producers to look to
external markets, this downturn is the opposite.
Turkey’s financial sector and domestic economy
remain relatively strong; however, the auto
industry’s export markets, which are now far
more important, have been negatively affected.
In a country where the automotive indus-
try is so closely tied to the overall economy, the
repercussions are very serious. Despite a 17
percent decrease in domestic sales in 2008,
total production was still up 4 percent and exports
were up 11 percent, thanks to a strong first half
of the year. (“Turkish Automotive Industry,”
p. 1) Foreshadowing a gloomy 2009, December
2008 year-over-year production, sales, and exports
were all down 50 percent or more. Turkey’s
2009 sales were indeed poor, as the recession and
auto industry contraction took hold. Yearly pro-
duction and exports both fell by over 30 percent
(“Automotive Industry Monthly Report . . . ,”
17
Figure 1
Turkish Auto Production
Source: Adapted by the author from data in Tezer’s “The Automotive Industry in Turkey . . .”
p. 2), resulting in the unemployment of thou-
sands of auto workers and a surge in excess
production capacity as plants scaled back.
Despite the poor current conditions,
Turkey’s auto industry is in a good position to
recover. Support from stronger domestic mar-
ket prospects, expansion in the export market,
and an eventual recovery in Europe should
stabilize Turkey and facilitate its recovery. As
of October 2009, there are already signs of a
turnaround in many markets. (“Auto Sector
Sees . . .”) It is expected that the Turkish auto
industry’s sales should almost fully return to
2008 levels in 2010 and enjoy a full recovery
by 2013. (“Turkey Autos Report . . . ,” p. 11)
Business Monitor International’s “Middle East
and East Africa Automotives Insight” report
concurs with a predicted recovery by 2013 and
adds that “industry majors are more likely to
resume output in Turkey than their West Euro-
pean plants, where production costs are higher
and markets will remain depressed.” (“Middle
East . . . ,” p. 9)
The Future: Increased Global
Competition
The Middle East remains an untapped and
lucrative market, one which Turkey is well-posi-
tioned to serve. New auto competitors are also
trying to establish themselves in the region.
Competition arises on many fronts within the
broader region of Africa and the Middle East. For
example, Turkey’s neighbor Iran is a developing
automotive manufacturer, although so far
only a domestically oriented one. Neverthe-
less, Iran is looking to expand throughout the
Middle East (though there are a number of polit-
ical complications to this objective) and consid-
ers Turkey both a potential export market and a
threat. (Ahedini and Perdy) Developing auto
industries in Egypt, the UAE, and South Africa
are likewise trying to become players in the
world car market. Business Monitor Interna-
tional also publishes quarterly reports on
Turkey’s auto industry. These reports include
a comparison of the “business environment” for
the auto industry in African and Middle Eastern
countries. When aspects such as sales, growth,
trade, and location are considered, Turkey
emerges on top of all other countries in these
regions. (“Turkey Autos Report . . . ,” p. 13)
Turkey’s experience in auto manufactur-
ing also helps differentiate it from new regional
competitors. Among other advantages that have
resulted from the Customs Union, quality
investments made by the industry have set it
apart from other countries in the area. (“Turkey
Has Transformed . . .”) Obtaining world class
quality certifications, such as International
Organization for Standardization certifications,
has turned into an “institutional norm.” (Wasti
and Wasti, p. 120) In the four years prior to
2007, Ford Otosan, Ford’s long established joint
venture with Koç, had Ford’s highest European
quality rating. (Uludag, p. 1) Quality, business
climate, and alignment with EU financial and
legal standards have helped Turkey to out-
shine its competition. Despite the increased
international competition, Turkey is still a
destination for manufacturers looking to serve
a large domestic and export market simulta-
neously.
Driving Forward
Recovering from this downturn and main-
taining a competitive edge are absolutely essen-
tial for both the auto industry and the coun-
try. Turks must embrace the potential for this
industry to propel them into the international
community. Strengthening and building on the
industry’s unique advantages while providing
a favorable business environment are impera-
tive for continuing success.
The Turkish government has attempted to
soften the blow of the world economic down-
turn on auto producers’ domestic sales by offer-
ing tax breaks to private consumers. One of
the major factors restricting domestic sales is
Turkey’s high taxes. The average VAT is 18
percent, and there are additional special con-
sumption taxes and motor vehicle taxes on
autos. (“Taxes . . .”) As mentioned in many
conversations that I have had with individuals
in Turkey, taxes on autos make ownership very
expensive and severely stifle sales. A series of tax
breaks were implemented at the start of 2009 to
try to lessen the impact of the auto crisis;
however, the tax breaks were not permanent.
According to the monthly sales numbers, there
was a temporary increase in the middle of the
year; yet, just as with the incentives, the
increased sales did not last. Turkey’s domestic
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auto industry will eventually recover, but Turkey
could jumpstart this process and stoke future
growth by making the tax breaks permanent.
Unfortunately, the Turkish government decided
to impose a higher gas tax in 2009, increas-
ing prices on an already expensive product in
Turkey by another 8 percent. (“Turkey Autos
Report . . . ,” p. 34) This increase in the cost of
fuel is not what the industry needs and surely
comes at a bad time, especially since the domestic
market is becoming more and more important.
Perhaps the current crisis will have effects
similar to the 2001 financial meltdown for the
auto industry. Whereas the 2001 crisis forced
manufacturers to look outwards for markets, the
current crisis and its lessened effect on Turkey
might open producers’ eyes to the very lucra-
tive domestic market once again. With the
help of the government through tax reductions,
the industry could be prompted to shift its focus
internally and further develop its programs
for domestic sale and production.
The manufacturing and assembly serv-
ices that Turkey can provide to EU companies
bring Turkey and the EU closer together, an
important factor considering Turkey’s accession
aspirations. The link between them has been
strengthened by trade partnerships such as the
Customs Union, the success of which reflects
positively on Turkey’s membership bid. Addition-
ally, Turkey must continue to nurture export
markets outside the EU. In 2009 Ford started
to import Turkish-made Transit vans to the
United States, which have been quite success-
ful in terms of both sales and reviews, proving
that Turkishmanufacturing is up tomeeting rig-
orous U.S. standards. The Transit even won the
2010 North American Truck of the Year award at
the 2010 Detroit Auto Show. Renault has also
embraced Turkey in the aftermath of the world
auto crisis, announcing that it would shift pro-
duction of a popular model, the Clio, to Turkey
in 2010. (“Renault to Shift Clio . . .”) Koç Hold-
ings’ joint venture with Fiat, Tofas, has opened
a design center in Turkey and is now starting
to manage entire product lines within the coun-
try. (Tofas Turk . . .) Tofas hopes to continue to
expand this ability and show that Turkey can
be an end-to-end development center for per-
sonal vehicles for both the domestic and export
markets. Continuing to build international
and diversified relationships such as these will
help to make Turkey more valuable to manu-
facturers while it will make the industry better
positioned for long-term growth and success.
Realizing the importance of the auto
industry, the Turkish government has recently
passed many incentive programs. To stimulate
automotive companies, Turkey has established
trade regions called “free zones” which allow for
attractive tax breaks. (Undersecretariat . . .)
While automotive manufacturers are scattered
across the country, many are centered around
the city of Bursa, the first free zone, which
has developed into Turkey’s Detroit. (Bursa,
p. 8) The government has also put in place other
incentives for qualifying firms, regardless of
location, such as tax credits, energy support,
land allocation, and tax law provisions to make
R&D expenditures 100 percent tax deductible.
(Investment Support . . .)
The sustainability of all auto manufac-
turers’ current production and product devel-
opment functions in Turkey is vital. The foreign
firms in Turkey all have varying degrees of
production and development managed on site.
It will be important for Turkey to continue to
bring in new models to replace current ones
as those models mature. (“Is Turkey Worth
It?” p. 2) Many Turkish auto companies find it
especially important to establish Turkey as a
regional center of excellence, where completely
new vehicles can be designed and specific tech-
nical expertise can be developed. This sentiment
was echoed by General Secretary Tezer of the
Turkish Automotive Manufacturers Association,
who says that in the Turkish auto industry’s
development “the final phase is to move from
being a ‘production hub’ to a ‘centre of excel-
lence’ by developing product design, research
and development.” (Tezer, as quoted in Turgut)
Increased investments frommanufacturers will
be crucial for companies to expand their current
operations. As General Secretary Tezer said in
an interview with Foreign Direct Investment
magazine, “The present-day success of Turkey’s
motor vehicle industry is the result of invest-
ments made in the past. If the nation wants to
maintain its position and to make new moves
it must make new investments. FDI is the key
in this area.” (Tezer, as quoted in Demirsar) The
Turkish Automotive Manufacturers Association
estimates that with the proper investments and
expansion the industry could sustain auto
19
exports of $40 billion per year, a very sizeable
amount for Turkey.
In short, Turkey is on its way to becom-
ing more than just a manufacturing center
and auto exporter. Untapped domestic and local
markets as well as favorable new government
policies have the potential to put Turkey on
the map as a permanent location for automotive
companies.
Conclusion
Turkey’s economy and the country’s future
growth depend on the vitality of its automo-
tive industry. Automotive industries are key sec-
tors in developing countries, and in Turkey
the industry has played a large role in the coun-
try’s industrialization. The industry must com-
plete the transformation it has started, from
manufacturing hub to regional center of excel-
lence and development. As important as foreign
investment and increased exports are, Turkey
must not forget to look inwards at its cur-
rently underappreciated and underdeveloped
domestic automotive sales opportunities.
In the last few decades, thanks to the right
combination of developmental ingredients, the
Turkish automotive industry has become an
important driving force behind Turkey’s export-
oriented economic success. By combining the
large potential of domestic growth with
Turkey’s well established export opportunities
the auto industry is now poised to lead Turkey
forward.
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